Global Health Institute

To prevent future global catastrophes, Dr. Cameron described the importance of responding proactively in current situations. Talking about global health leadership, she remarked, “It’s so easy to get focused on what’s right in front of you, but you’ll constantly be chasing the last crisis if you do. You always have to be thinking about the next issue that might come along.” As tragic as they are, global health crises, such as the SARS outbreak in 2003 or H1N1 in 2009, provide a unique opportunity for systemic change. Emergencies focus attention on pandemic risks and generate political support for preparedness efforts, and the global health community can build on such momentum to win funding and develop lasting international institutions.

Emphasizing this point, Dr. Cameron discussed her work during the Obama Administration’s Ebola response. The outbreak generated newfound interest in global health and pandemic threats in Congress, attention which Dr. Cameron translated into a $1 billion emergency appropriation for global health security. She cooperated with political leaders and global health experts to develop and launch the Global Health Security Agenda, an international partnership to improve countries’ abilities to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases. Supported by US funding, countries like Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Cameroon improved their disease surveillance and reporting systems, functions which could prove vital in detecting and responding to future outbreaks.

That said, Dr. Cameron also acknowledged that governments and policy-makers cannot completely eliminate biosecurity risks on their own. Moving forward, the global health security community must engage with other disciplines, industries, and individuals who are not traditionally involved with international security or public health.

Dual-use research of concern represents one such risk which requires cooperation. As science and technology progress, our capacity to synthesize biological agents from scratch will improve exponentially as well. While modifying pathogens quickly, cheaply, and effectively can often prove a boon for medical research, it also poses enormous risks of mistake or misuse. Dr. Cameron noted that a day will come when individuals can easily modify smallpox from scratch, making it vaccine-resistant or otherwise more dangerous. To minimize risks, Dr. Cameron argued that we need, “not just a culture of responsibility, but also hardware. Engaging scientists on issues of safety and security is the field of the future.” Government regulations can help ensure research is safe and responsible, but laws and policies lag behind scientific and technological innovations. Accordingly, scientists and engineers should take the lead on artificial biological threats, exploring potential dangers and developing systems to prevent them. By emphasizing the potential human costs of leaving such risks unchecked, the global health security community can broaden its membership to include these non-traditional actors.

Acknowledging the wide variety of biosecurity concerns the world faces, one quickly begins to wonder how individuals like Dr. Cameron sleep at night. Most likely, it is because these experts recognize that catastrophes are not inevitable. With proactive international actions and an engaged global populace, potential biosecurity threats can be foreseen and prevented, saving thousands, if not millions, of lives.

Allison Ross (NHS ’20) is a junior in the School of Nursing and Health Studies, currently pursuing a major in Global Health.

This blog was written by a student in Georgetown’s Conversations in Global Health course, which brings leaders in global health to Georgetown to discuss their careers and work.